Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional worth in conflict

Joan Esteban () and József Sákovics

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.

Keywords: Coalition formation; conflict; alliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2015)
Journal Article: Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict (2003)
Working Paper: Olson vs. Coase: coalitional worth in conflict (2002)
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