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Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Messan Agbaglah

Theory and Decision, 2017, vol. 82, issue 3, 435-459

Abstract: Abstract We model the formation of coalitions that are not necessarily disjoint. We propose a new bargaining game that yields an overlapping coalition structure as an outcome. Equilibrium does not always exist in pure strategies for such a game, but we show that it always exists with a mild degree of mixed strategies. We derive conditions for a complete duality between networks and overlapping coalitions, and we provide a new rationale for the sequential formation of networks.

Keywords: Overlapping coalitions; Network; Bargaining; Cover function game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D62 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (2010) Downloads
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