Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Messan Agbaglah and Lars Ehlers

No 96628, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2010-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/96628/files/NDL2010-116.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2017)
Working Paper: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2014)
Working Paper: Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:96628

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.96628

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