Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Messan Agbaglah and Lars Ehlers

No 2010.116, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.

Keywords: Overlapping Coalitions; Cover Function; Bargaining; Symmetric Game; Network (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 D62 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2017)
Working Paper: Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks (2014)
Working Paper: Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.116

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