Are you Injurer or Victim? Liability for Accidents under Role-Type Uncertainty

Nuno Garoupa and Adrián Segura

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2021, vol. 177, issue 4, 391-403

Abstract: We show that when parties are uncertain about their nature (injurer or victim) in accidents, conventional results in the bilateral accident model need to be reassessed. Legal policy implications are derived. Specifically, the efficient liability rule inevitably begs for a form of negligence that internalizes uncertainty concerning the parties (injurer or victim) and their subjective perceptions.

Keywords: tort liability; role-type uncertainty; negligence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0013

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