The Demand for Social Approval and Status as a Motivation to Give

Jeroen van de Ven ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, vol. 158, issue 3, 464-482

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explain gift giving as due to a demand for social approval and status. In a simple framework we are able to account for a number of stylized facts. These are that gift giving is often reciprocal, that gifts tend to be inadequate, and that gift giving is sometimes reduced after a monetary compensation is offered. The implication for the interaction between gift giving and the market institution is that implementing price incentives in a nonmarket environment can be welfare-decreasing.

JEL-codes: A10 A12 D10 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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