Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?
Giovanni Anania () and
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, vol. 160, issue 4, 681-701
Most food products can be classified as credence goods, and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. Rather than having no regulation in place, producers of high-quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached that leads to an imperfect regulation. Some of the producers of low-quality goods benefit by cheating under a not fully credible regulation. Even producers of low-quality goods who will never label their products as being of high quality may profit from the introduction of an imperfect regulation.
JEL-codes: D82 L15 L51 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: PUBLIC REGULATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TRUST IN QUALITY FOOD MARKETS. WHAT IF THE TRUST SUBSTITUTE CANNOT BE FULLY TRUSTED? (2003)
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