Endogenous Leadership in Teams
Steffen Huck () and
Pedro Rey-Biel ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, vol. 162, issue 2, 253-261
We study the mechanics of leading by example in teams. Leadership is beneficial for the entire team when agents are conformists, i.e., dislike effort differentials. We also show how leadership can arise endogenously and discuss what type of leader benefits a team most.
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D63 J31 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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