Status Quo Deference and Policy Choice under Ambiguity

Charles Manski

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2013, vol. 169, issue 1, 116-128

Abstract: Institutions for collective decision making often defer to the status quo, granting it a privileged position relative to proposed policy innovations. The possible benefits of status quo deference must be weighed against a cost: status quo deference can prevent a society from learning the merits of innovations. This paper explores the potential for learning through adaptive diversification of treatment choice in decision systems that feature status quo deference. I first review the basic elements of my earlier analysis of adaptive diversification by a planner and then extend the analysis to two collective decision processes, voting and bilateral negotiation.

JEL-codes: D70 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X660474

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