The Structure of Firm-Specific Labour Unions

Thorsten Upmann and Julia Müller ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2014, vol. 170, issue 2, 336-364

Abstract: We apply a model with two types of labour where each group decides on whether it prefers to be represented by an independent craft-specific labour union or by a joint union. Applying the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, we find that it is beneficial for at least one group of labourers to form its own independent union - and in some cases even both groups are worse off under a joint union. Consequently, a joint union must be considered as a rather unstable institution. Correspondingly, profits are lower if the firm bargains with two independent craft unions.

JEL-codes: C78 J31 J41 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13941110635976

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