Cooling Off in Negotiations: Does it Work?

Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider and Patrick Schmitz

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2015, vol. 171, issue 4, 565-588

Abstract: Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling off. We also study the effect of subjects' degree of icognitive reflectionj on their behavior.

JEL-codes: C78 C99 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2009)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008)
Working Paper: Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? (2008)
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DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14307212950056

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