Prejudice and truth about the effect of testosterone on human bargaining behaviour

C. Eisenegger (), M. Naef, R. Snozzi, M. Heinrichs and Ernst Fehr
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C. Eisenegger: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University of Zurich
M. Naef: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University of Zurich
R. Snozzi: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University of Zurich
M. Heinrichs: Laboratory for Biological and Personality Psychology, University of Freiburg

Nature, 2010, vol. 463, issue 7279, 356-359

Abstract: Perception-fuelled behaviour Hormones are known to modulate social interactions between animals, with testosterone classically thought to induce aggressive behaviour. Although this categorization has been extrapolated to humans — hence the familiar concept of 'testosterone-fuelled' behaviour — it is unclear whether testosterone does in fact promote antisocial actions. In a bargaining game, a single dose of testosterone was found to increase fair behaviour, reduce conflict and enhance social interactions. But those subjects who were led to believe that they had received testosterone, whether or not they actually had, behaved more unfairly than those who thought they had received placebo, again whether or not they actually did. Thus the negative, antisocial connotation of increasing testosterone seems strong enough to induce negative social behaviour even when the biological result is actually the opposite.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1038/nature08711

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