Economies with Asymmetrically Informed Agents: the Concept of Limit Information

Valeriy Marakulin ()

Journal of the New Economic Association, 2009, issue 1-2, 62-85

Abstract: In this paper, a new concept of "limit information" is introduced and studied for Arrow-Debreu type economies with asymmetrically informed agents. The concept is based on the so-called contractual approach that presumes that agents meet and form coalitions, where the concurrent exchange of commodities and information is realized. So, in the course of a natural exchange process, the agents' information is repeatedly transformed and accumulated, and agents learn and achieve limit information. It is proved that, for a monotone information sharing rule, limit information is unique, i.e., it does not depend of the chain of coalitions implemented in the process of interaction between economic agents.

Keywords: Exchange economy; contract; asymmetrical information; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:1-2:p:62-85

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