Incentives for Protecting Farm Workers from Pesticides

John U. Davis, Julie Caswell () and Carolyn R. Harper

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1992, vol. 74, issue 4, 907-917

Abstract: Three regulatory incentive systems that may induce farmers to protect farmworkers from pesticide-related harm are modeled: ex post regulation via tort liability and workers' compensation systems, respectively. and ex ante regulation (fines) by administrative agencies. An empirical application examines the farmer's decision whether to comply with required precautions as well as penalties for noncompliance. Results indicate tort liability and administrative agency regulation, as practiced, provide relatively insignificant incentives, while a workers' compensation system, if fully experiencerated, may offer a more effective incentive. Nevertheless, penalties in all cases may be too small overall to have much influence on farmers' compliance decisions.

Date: 1992
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