Agricultural Export Subsidies as a Tool of Trade Strategy: Before and after the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996

Howard Leathers

American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2001, vol. 83, issue 1, 209-221

Abstract: If the main justification for agricultural export subsidies is that they reduce government costs of deficiency payments, then the 1996 farm legislation would make U.S. export subsidies largely unnecessary. An additional argument advanced in favor of export subsidies is that their aggressive use by one country will cause competing countries to reduce or discontinue their own subsidies. This argument is explored by means of a Nash equilibrium in which countries choose both a base subsidy level and a response to competitors, and by a consistent conjectures equilibrium. Little support is found for the argument. Copyright 2001, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
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