Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short-Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives

James Rebitzer and Lowell Taylor

Economic Inquiry, 1995, vol. 33, issue 2, 257-73

Abstract: This paper examines the role that work incentives play in the determination of work hours. The authors use a conventional efficiency wage model to analyze how firms respond to worker preferences regarding wage-hours packages. In contrast to previous work, they study markets in which workers have heterogeneous preferences. In this context, the authors demonstrate that job offers will specify both wages and work hours and many individuals will not be able to work their preferred number of hours. They show that the labor-market equilibrium may be characterized by a less than optimal number of short-hour jobs. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1995
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Working Paper: Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives (1991)
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