Does Fact-Finding Promote Settlement? Theory and a Test

David Dickinson and Lynn Hunnicutt

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 2, 401-416

Abstract: Nonbinding recommendations, such as provided by fact-finders, are shown to significantly increase voluntary settlements in bargaining. Theoretically, it is unclear whether recommendations will increase settlement rates. A recommendation may reduce outcome uncertainty, thereby "chilling" bargaining and increasing dispute rates. On the other hand, a recommendation may give the parties a focal point around which an agreement is made. Which of these effects dominates is a question that we consider using theory and data from controlled bargaining experiments. The data show the dominance of a focal point effect for suggestions, highlighting their potential role in improving dispute settlement procedures.(JEL C78, C92, J52) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C78 C92 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbi027 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: DOES FACT-FINDING PROMOTE SETTLEMENT? THEORY AND A TEST (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:401-416

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().