Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions

Steffen Andersen, Julie Marx, Kasper Meisner Nielsen and Lise Vesterlund

The Economic Journal, 2021, vol. 131, issue 638, 2304-2332

Abstract: Negotiations over real estate show that men secure better prices than women. However, gender differences decrease when improving controls for the property's value, and is eliminated when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in a repeated-sales sample. Rather than evidence of differences in negotiation, price differences result from men and women demanding different properties. Consistently, we find no gender difference in sales prices secured for inherited property. Provided appropriate controls, men and women fare equally well when negotiating over real estate. Our study demonstrates that inference on gender differences in negotiation relies critically on controlling for the value of the negotiated item.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence from Real Estate Transactions (2020)
Working Paper: Gender Differences in Negotiation: Evidence fro Real Estate Transactions (2018)
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