Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment

Çağatay Bircan and Orkun Saka

The Economic Journal, 2021, vol. 131, issue 639, 2763-2796

Abstract: We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and political alignment of incumbent mayors. This effect only exists in corporate lending and creates credit constraints for firms in opposition areas, which suffer drops in assets, employment and sales but not firm entry. Financial resources and factors of production are misallocated as more efficient provinces and industries suffer the greatest constraints, reducing aggregate productivity.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment (2021)
Working Paper: Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment (2018)
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