Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Isaac Mbiti, Mauricio Romero and Youdi Schipper

The Economic Journal, 2023, vol. 133, issue 653, 1968-2000

Abstract: We use a nationally representative field experiment in Tanzania to compare two teacher performance pay systems in public primary schools: a ‘pay-for-percentile’ system (a rank-order tournament) and a ‘levels’ system that features multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for percentile can potentially induce socially optimal effort among teachers, while levels systems can encourage teachers to focus on students near passing thresholds. Despite the theoretical advantage of the tournament system, we find that both systems improved student test scores across the distribution of initial learning levels after two years. However, the levels system is easier to implement and is more cost effective.

Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania (2019)
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