Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos

Caroline Le Pennec

The Economic Journal, 2024, vol. 134, issue 658, 785-810

Abstract: Politicians seeking to persuade voters may not always be able to say what they would like to say. Adopting policy positions opposite to that of their party or contradicting their previous policy announcements may be costly. I use computational text analysis on 30,000 candidate manifestos from two-round French elections to show that politicians take these costs into account, by toeing the party line and sticking to their platform, while also strategically adjusting their campaign communication and advertising neutral non-policy issues when they need to reach a broader electorate. I provide suggestive evidence that this moderation of electoral discourse predicts better performance in office and may therefore provide valuable information to voters.

Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Strategic Campaign Communication: Evidence from 30,000 Candidate Manifestos (2020)
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