Policy Choices and Interdependence of Country Decisions in the Implementation of the 1994 GATT Agreement on Agriculture

Giovanni Anania ()

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1997, vol. 24, issue 2, 161-81

Abstract: This paper discusses the linkages among the different obligations entailed in the GATT Agreement on Agriculture. It is shown that each country's choice between feasible policy alternatives crucially depends on the analogous choices made by other countries. This means that there is a game structure inherent in the GATT implementation process. Any modelling effort aimed at forecasting the implications of implementing the GATT Agreement which does not take into consideration the linkages among the various commitments, the policy choices to be made by each country, or the game structure inherent in the implementation process, is likely to yield incorrect results. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:161-81

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo

More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().