Manager remuneration, share buybacks, and firm performance

Herbert Dawid, Philipp Harting and Sander van der Hoog

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2019, vol. 28, issue 3, 681-706

Abstract: Using a dynamic heterogeneous agent industry model, we examine the impact of manager remuneration schemes on firms’ investment decisions and on the evolution of their competitiveness and share values. Whereas an increase in the share-based manager remuneration component is always beneficial to the manager, it is beneficial for shareholders only if such a change in the remuneration scheme is adopted by all firms in the industry. In that case, productivity growth is slowed down and workers’ real wages are reduced.

JEL-codes: C63 D25 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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