Power in sovereign debt markets: debtors’ coordination for more competitive outcomes

Martin Guzman, Maia Colodenco and Anahí Wiedenbrug

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2024, vol. 33, issue 2, 507-518

Abstract: Evidence suggests that sovereign debt markets are not featured by perfect competition but power dynamics are a key determinant of market outcomes such as ex-post returns on sovereign bonds. In such environment, coordination within each side of the market matters. With the purpose of influencing the international debt architecture, private creditors have historically been fairly coordinated and their interests more aligned ex-ante. Sovereign debtors, however, have not. The power asymmetry that that entails has equity and efficiency implications, both ex-ante and ex-post. This paper analyzes asymmetries in collective action of each side of the sovereign debt market and the mechanisms through which it affects market outcomes. It also analyses the Cartagena Group’s experience in the 1980s as a prominent historical case of greater borrower coordination and identifies mechanisms through which greater debtor coordination could be fostered.

Date: 2024
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