Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and Political Business Cycles in Africa

Steven Block, Karen E. Ferree and Smita Singh

Journal of African Economies, 2003, vol. 12, issue 3, 444-468

Abstract: Political business cycle (PBC) theory and empirics typically assume that elections are competitive. Yet, as empirical work on PBCs turns increasingly to developing countries for evidence, this assumption becomes untenable. We propose and test two empirical hypotheses regarding PBCs: first, we should only see cycles when elections involve multiparty competition; secondly, we should see larger cycles in 'founding' elections. Using a new indicator of multiparty competition and macroeconomic data from Africa, we find strong support for our first hypothesis and moderate support for the second. These findings have implications for democratic transitions and the compatibility of economic and political reform in nascent democracies. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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