Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany

Steven Kaplan ()

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1994, vol. 10, issue 1, 142-59

Abstract: This article examines executive turnover--for both management and supervisory boards--and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e., negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover-performance relations do not vary with measures of stock owenrship and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments and turnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany (1994)
Working Paper: Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany (1993)
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