Verifiability and Contract Enforcement: A Model with Judicial Moral Hazard

Murat Usman ()

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2002, vol. 18, issue 1, 67-94

Abstract: I model the litigation of a contract containing a variable not observable by courts, hence nonverifiable, unless the rational and self-interested judge exerts effort. He values the correct ruling but dislikes effort. Judicial effort is discretionary. I show that effort cost is inconsequential--"always breach" is equilibrium for any effort cost. But there exists another equilibrium where a small breach rate is achieved even with significant effort costs. Maximal remedies for breach are not optimal. Because effort is discretionary, low effort cost increases breach. Pretrial negotiations can have a substantial negative impact on verifiability under arbitrarily small deviations from full rationality. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
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