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Promotions, Dismissals, and Employee Selection: Theory and Evidence

Anders Frederiksen () and Előd Takáts
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Elod Takats

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2011, vol. 27, issue 1, 159-179

Abstract: Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of incentives, such as fixed wages, bonus payments, promotion options, and dismissals or threats of dismissal. In this article, we show that firms having a production process that is sensitive to employee quality may find it optimal to combine cost-efficient incentives such as bonuses and promotions with dismissals. Based on this result, we derive a hierarchy of incentives. Furthermore, we demonstrate the close link between the optimal contract and the employee sorting and selection and use this to analyse the information conveyed in employment matches. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email:, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2011
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