Economics at your fingertips  

Procedural Fairness and the Cost of Control

Judd B. Kessler and Stephen Leider ()

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2016, vol. 32, issue 4, 685-718

Abstract: A large and growing literature has demonstrated that imposing control on agents has the potential to backfire, leading agents to withhold effort. Consistent with principles of procedural fairness, we find that the way in which control is imposed—in particular whether control is imposed symmetrically on both principals and agents and whether both parties have a say in whether control is imposed—affects how agents respond to control. In our setting, control leads agents to withhold effort only when procedural fairness concerns are ignored and control is imposed unilaterally with an asymmetric effect on the agent. (JEL C7, C9, L2, M5)

JEL-codes: C7 C9 L2 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Pablo T. Spiller

More articles in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

Page updated 2020-04-24
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:4:p:685-718.