Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

“Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States

Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giancarlo Spagnolo

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2020, vol. 36, issue 3, 537-597

Abstract: To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).

Date: 2020
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes (2019)
Working Paper: Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes (2018)
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