Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giancarlo Spagnolo

No 24201, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. Using an instrumental variable strategy, we find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.

JEL-codes: H11 H57 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-lma and nep-pbe
Note: IO LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published as Francesco Decarolis & Leonardo M Giuffrida & Elisabetta Iossa & Vincenzo Mollisi & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol 36(3), pages 537-597.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes (2020)
Working Paper: Bureaucratic competence and procurement outcomes (2019)
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