Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
Bengt Holmstrom () and
Paul Milgrom ()
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, vol. 7, issue 0, 24-52
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1333) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Pablo T. Spiller
More articles in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().