Seniority Seating at the Royal Opera House
Jeff Frank () and
Eric Smith ()
Oxford Economic Papers, 1996, vol. 48, issue 3, 492-98
This paper examines lotteries and seniority queues as forms of commodity bundling price discrimination. There are good and bad seats, and two types of potential purchasers. Offered the choice of a high-priced good seat and a moderately-priced bundle of good and bad seats, customers self-select into high and low valuation types. For single-period purchases, the bundle is a lottery over good and bad seats. For repeated purchases, monopolists such as the Royal Opera House can do better by setting up a seniority allocation system. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
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