The Arms Trade Game: From Laissez-Faire to a Common Defence Policy

Paul Levine () and Ronald Smith

Oxford Economic Papers, 2000, vol. 52, issue 2, 357-80

Abstract: Multinational arms export control has been the subject of discussion in a variety of fora, from the United Nations through to the Wassenaar group of arms producers. It is widely recognised that free trade in arms can have negative externalities on national security and there are benefits from the international coordination of controls. However, there has been relatively little economic analysis of these issues, partly because the market for arms is somewhat unusual. This paper develops a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market and compares a variety of possible regimes from laissez-faire at one extreme, to a common defence policy at the other. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2000
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