Identifying price-leadership structures in oligopoly

Sang-Hyun Kim, Hao Lan and Paul W Dobson

Oxford Economic Papers, 2021, vol. 73, issue 1, 350-370

Abstract: Oligopoly can give rise to complex patterns of price interaction and adjustment. While oligopolistic firms may divide into price leaders and price followers, it is conceivable that some may take on dual roles, being a leader to one group but a follower to a different group in a hierarchical structure. The contribution of this article is to show how such dual relationships are possible in theory along with providing an empirical method to help identify price-leadership structures in n-firm oligopoly. As an illustration, we apply the method to British supermarkets and find a three-tier leader–follower structure.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 L41 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Identifying Price-Leadership Structures in Oligopoly (2016)
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