Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks

Stephen Leider (), Markus M. Möbius, Tanya Rosenblat and Quoc-Anh Do

The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, vol. 124, issue 4, 1815-1851

Abstract: We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2008)
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