Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks

Quoc-Anh Do, Stephen Leider (), Markus Mobius () and Tanya Rosenblat

No 17-2008, Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: We conduct online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52 percent relative to random strangers, while future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24 percent when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Keywords: modified dictator games; directed altruism; enforced reciprocity; social networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 Pages
Date: 2008-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series

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Related works:
Journal Article: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
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