Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study
Theo Offerman and
Jan Potters
The Review of Economic Studies, 2006, vol. 73, issue 3, 769-791
Abstract:
We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though, and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly. These results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits. In oligopoly, entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path. In monopoly, taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit-maximizing price. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (54)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00395.x (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Does auctioning of entry licences induce collusions? An experimental study (2006) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:3:p:769-791
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman
More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().