Interdependent Durations

Bo E. Honor and Aureo de Paula

The Review of Economic Studies, 2010, vol. 77, issue 3, 1138-1163

Abstract: This paper studies the identification of a simultaneous equation model involving duration measures. It proposes a game theoretic model in which durations are determined by strategic agents. In the absence of strategic motives, the model delivers a version of the generalized accelerated failure time model. In its most general form, the system resembles a classical simultaneous equation model in which endogenous variables interact with observable and unobservable exogenous components to characterize an economic environment. In this paper, the endogenous variables are the individually chosen equilibrium durations. Even though a unique solution to the game is not always attainable in this context, the structural elements of the economic system are shown to be semi-parametrically identified. We also present a brief discussion of estimation ideas and a set of simulation studies on the model. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2010
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