Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

Luc Laeven and Ross Levine ()

The Review of Financial Studies, 2008, vol. 21, issue 2, 579-604

Abstract: The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007)
Working Paper: Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2006)
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