Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract

Matthias Efing, Harald Hau, Patrick Kampkötter and Jean Rochet

The Review of Financial Studies, 2023, vol. 36, issue 1, 235-280

Abstract: We argue that risk sharing motivates the bankwide structure of bonus pay. In the presence of financial frictions that make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk sharing whereby bonus pay partially absorbs negative earnings shocks. Using payroll data formillion employee-years in all functional divisions of Austrian, German, and Swiss banks, we uncover several empirical patterns in bonus pay that are difficult to rationalize exclusively with incentive theories of bonus pay but that support an important risk sharing motive.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

JEL-codes: D86 G01 G20 G21 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2023)
Working Paper: Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2019)
Working Paper: Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2018)
Working Paper: Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2018)
Working Paper: Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract (2018)
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