Courting Economic Development

James Brown (), J. Anthony Cookson and Rawley Z. Heimer

The World Bank Economic Review, 2017, vol. 30, issue Supplement_1, S176-S187

Abstract: We show that court enforcement uncertainty hinders economic development using sharp variation in judiciaries across Native American reservations in the United States. Congressional legislation passed in 1953 assigned state courts the authority to resolve civil disputes on a subset of reservations, while tribal courts retained authority on unaffected reservations. Although affected and unaffected reservations had similar economic conditions when the law passed, reservations under state courts experienced significantly greater long-run growth. When we examine the distribution of incomes across reservations, the average difference in development is due to the lower incomes of the most impoverished reservations with tribal courts. We show that the relative under-development of reservations with tribal courts is driven by reservations with the most uncertainty in court enforcement.

JEL-codes: K10 N22 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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