Strategic Delegation: An Experiment

Chaim Fershtman () and Uri Gneezy

RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 32, issue 2, 352-68

Abstract: We examine the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Specifically, we show that when the proposer uses a delegate, his share increases. Since in such a case the proposer does not use the delegate as a commitment device, this effect identifies an additional explanation of the delegation phenomenon. This result holds when delegation is mandatory or optional. We also show that unobserved delegation by the responder reduces his share as his delegate is perceived to be more willing to accept tough offers. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic delegation: An experiment (1997)
Working Paper: Strategic delegation: An experiment (1997)
Working Paper: Strategic Delegation: An Experiment (1996)
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