Strategic Delegation: An Experiment
Chaim Fershtman () and
Working Papers from Tel Aviv
This paper examines the effects of strategic delegation in a simple ultimatum game experiment. Our main concern is to examine the effect of delegation on the way players think about the game and how the play it.
Keywords: GAMES; STATISTICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Strategic Delegation: An Experiment (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic delegation: An experiment (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:43-96
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