 Careerist JudgesRAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 2, 275-297 Abstract: I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to be "creative," i.e., to inefficiently contradict previous decisions. Keywords: Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior Asymmetric and Private Information s career concerns; judicial decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:2:p:275-297 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation |
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