Careerist Judges

Gilat Levy

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: In this paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to contradict previous decisions inefficiently. I also show that judges behave more efficiently when elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges.

Keywords: Career concerns; judicial decision-making. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Careerist Judges (2005)
Working Paper: Careerist judges (2005)
Working Paper: Careerist Judges (2003)
Working Paper: Careerist judges (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:457

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