Careerist judges

Gilat Levy

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to be "creative," i.e., to inefficiently contradict previous decisions.

JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, 36(2), pp. 275-297. ISSN: 0741-6261

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Related works:
Journal Article: Careerist Judges (2005)
Working Paper: Careerist Judges (2003)
Working Paper: Careerist Judges (2003)
Working Paper: Careerist judges (2003)
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