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Do Exposure Suits Produce a "Race to File"? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson ()

RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 3, 613-627

Abstract: Conventional tort law does not allow exposure victims to seek compensation until they develop symptoms of illness. Because this may bar recovery if the injurer is judgment proof, some have advocated allowing victims to sue at exposure. However, critics charge that such a tort for risk would create a ``race to file.'' We show that a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file even if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. We examine the consequences of the possible equilibria on compensation of victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk (2004) Downloads
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