Do Exposure Suits Produce a "Race to File"? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson ()

No 2004-25, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Conventional tort law does not allow exposure victims to seek compensation until they develop symptoms of illness. Because this may bar recovery if the injurer is judgment proof, some have advocated allowing victims to sue at exposure. However, critics charge that such a tort for risk would create a "race to file". We show that a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file even if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. We examine the consequences of the possible equilibria on compensation of victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
Note: We thank Patrick Gonzalez, Raymond Deneckere (editor), two referees, participants at the annual American Law and Economics Association Meetings, Harvard Univ., May 2002, the CIRANO-IDEI-LEERNA Conference on Regulation, Liability, and the Management of Major Industrial/Environmental Risks, Toulouse, France, June 2003, and colleagues at the University of Connecticut for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2004-25.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do Exposure Suits Produce a "Race to File"? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk (2005)
Working Paper: Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2004-25

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel ().