Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Thomas Miceli and Kathleen Segerson ()

No 2002-42, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

JEL-codes: K13 K32 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2001-10, Revised 2004-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Do Exposure Suits Produce a "Race to File"? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk (2005)
Working Paper: Do Exposure Suits Produce a "Race to File"? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2002-42

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